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University of Iowa 
Reading de Man Reading, ed. Wlad Godzich, Lindsay Waters. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. 312 pp. 
Reading de Man Reading, edited by Wlad Godzich and Lindsay 
Waters, contains distinguished essays on the critical theory of Paul de 
Man; contributors include Geoffrey Hartman, Jacques Derrida, 
Deborah Esch, Niel Hertz, Carol Jacobs, Peggy Kamuf, Kevin 
Newmark, J. Hillis Miller, Werner Hamacher, Hans Robert Jauss, 
Geoffrey Bennington, Bill Readings, Timothy Bahti, and Rodolphe 
Gasche. All of the pieces except Hartman's were written before the 
wartime writings of de Man were rediscovered, and therefore the 
majority of the volume consists of essays that directly and indirectly 
address de Man's writings from the 1960s on. Unfortunately, there is 
no introductory essay that serves the purpose of outlining the major 
phases of de Man's career or his central concepts, and therefore many 
of the references and allusions made by various contributors will be 
lost on those who are not already thoroughly familiar with de Man's 
work. Especially the pieces by Hertz, Jacobs, Miller, Jauss, 
Bennington, Newmark, and Gasche require that one closely examine 
entire essays by de Man before attempting to follow the commentary. 
Most specifically, anyone who engages Reading de Man Reading 
will be required to re-examine de Man's most seminal article, "The 
Rhetoric of Temporality," since many of the pieces either allude to its 
structure, refer to its guiding terms, or reinscribe its argument in other 
contexts. Given that requirement, I want to note a few of that essay's 
major points before discussing some of the contributions to Reading 
de Man Reading. 
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We may recall that "The Rhetoric of Temporality" was 
originally published in 1969 and that it is divided into two parts, 
"Allegory and Symbol" and "Irony." Both parts correspond very 
closely and can be seen as analogous to a two part musical invention. 
In the first part, de Man demonstrates by comparative literary 
analysis that during the 18th century the shift in rhetorical emphasis 
from allegorization to symbolization did not occur without resis- 
tance. He demonstrates the point in the context of German, English, 
and, finally, French literature. De Man argues that in Rousseau's 
Julie ou la nouvelle Heloise the analogy between scene and emotion 
is tightly joined thanks to the appearance of the symbol which brings 
signifying elements into a simultaneous relation. In Rousseau, there- 
fore, the text's naturalism and the contingency of temporal moments 
are rendered symbolically, though in the very garden scenes where 
such naturalism is constituted, de Man discovers an allegorical 
register which resists naturalism and, instead, embraces very artifi- 
cial conjunctions. These break with the sort of human perception that 
would function as the enabling condition for symbolization and 
naturalism: "The (allegorical' language is purely figural, not based on 
perception, less still on an experienced dialectic between nature and 
consciousness" (Blindness and Insight, 203). Whereas the symbol 
holds a language of natural correspondences together, allegory 
disrupts sensualistic correspondences even as it sets up a secondary 
order of references which are not organically related. For de Man the 
symbol brings entities into a spatial and simultaneous relation, while 
allegory brings entities into a temporal and disjunctive relation. 
Moreover, the symbol is assumed to be constative (passively reflect- 
ing what is always already given) while allegory is assumed to be per- 
formative (actively producing new meanings in a more or less ad hoc 
manner). But this is not all. Symbols ensure narrative continuity, 
while allegories ensure disjunctive iteration. Symbols therefore are 
aligned with identity while allegories are aligned with difference. At 
the close of "Symbol and Allegory" de Man will emphasize that 
symbol and allegory are not, in fact, two different rhetorical orders but 
that they are both aspects of the same rhetoric in whose conflict a 
rearticulation of literature is brought about. Yet, there is irony in this 
conflict. The impression of realist authenticity which the symbol con- 
veys is, in fact, known to be a superficial illusion which betrays the 
enlightenment of an earlier age that privileged allegory. Although 
allegory is superseded by the symbol in the nineteenth century, 2
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writers ironically are unable to use symbols with "an entirely good 
poetic conscience" (BI 208). 
In part two, de Man alerts us to two manifestations of irony, the 
one synthetic, the other disjunctive. This division of irony therefore 
imitates the difference between symbol and allegory, suggesting the 
musical structure of invention. The synthetic manifestation of irony 
allows for consciousness to reconcile a number of conflicts and for 
language to prevail over a subject's self-alienation. The disjunctive 
manifestation of irony introduces an endless sequence of disjunct 
moments which are never reconciled but infinitely repeated as the 
repetition of what de Man calls a self-escalating act of consciousness. 
Such irony "reveals the existence of a temporality that is definitely 
not organic, in that it relates to its source only in terms of distance and 
difference and allows for no end, for no totality" (BI 222). Yet, 
although the performance of disjunctive irony and of allegory reveal a 
similar temporal structure, that of iteration and difference, they are 
dissimilar in that allegory extends or spreads out temporality while 
irony compresses or condenses it. Still, irony and allegory are con- 
sidered "two faces of the same fundamental experience of time" (BI 
226). 
Turning at the very end of the essay to Stendhal's La Chartreuse 
de Parme, de Man notes that in Stendhal we have an instance in which 
disjunctive novelistic moments are symptomatic of irony, though, at 
the same time, one encounters slow meditative moments in which 
allegory comes to appear. De Man concludes by citing an allegorical 
emblem in place of an explanation. Stendhal's novel "tells the story of 
two lovers who, like Eros and Psyche, are never allowed to come into 
full contact with each other. When they can see each other they are 
separated by an unbreachable distance; when they can touch, it has to 
be in a darkness imposed by a totally arbitrary and irrational deci- 
sion, an act of the gods" (BI 228). The irony of light and dark or of 
disjunction and conjunction is very apparent in the allegory; yet, de 
Man calls this the "allegory of irony," by which he means the way in 
which irony is temporally extended if not subsumed by allegory. After 
all, an ironic story is being used allegorically to gloss Stendhal's 
novel. And yet, characteristic of de Man's thinking, such a position is 
counterbalanced by the fact that if an ironic story is being subsumed 
by allegory, this subsuming is itself so ironic that no one can say 
allegory is entirely dominant. 
Finally, there is one more twist to the screw: we should recall that 3
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for some time now nothing has been said about the symbol. Has it just 
dropped out of sight? De Man for his part says nothing. But if we look 
once more at the allegory of Psyche and Eros we will see that de Man 
has played a clever trick on us. For it is the case that Psyche and Eros 
are themselves figures which transform disjunctive allegorical rela- 
tions into an expression of unity by means of a symbolic embrace. 
Hence this symbolic embrace can be said to bring irony and allegory 
into a relation or correspondence which is naturalized from a purely 
human perspective. Although de Man does not explicitly point to a 
sublation of the symbol, "The Rhetoric of Temporality" does end by 
tacitly confirming the very historical understanding of symbolicity 
from which it has taken distance-the view that during the pre- 
Romantic and Romantic periods there is a decisive shift to 
symbolicity and ironization. In fact, if the symbol silently reasserts its 
pre-eminence at the end of the essay, it is only because such a reasser- 
tion is itself highly ironic, given the fact that the argument of de Man's 
essay is structured to preclude this very conclusion. Hence by 
countering the familiar historical account of how symbol and irony 
supplant allegory, de Man nevertheless reaffirms what has so success- 
fully been destabilized, the subjugation of allegory by symbol and 
irony. 
Some of the contributors to Reading de Man Reading who have 
strongly engaged "The Rhetoric of Temporality" include Timothy 
Bahti, J. Hillis Miller, Carol Jacobs, Kevin Newmark, Rodolphe 
Gasche, and Jacques Derrida. Indeed Jacobs, Bahti, and Miller come 
quite close to broaching an organic theory of de Man's critical 
development by highlighting the conceptual continuities between 
"The Rhetoric of Temporality" and de Man's later work, as if de 
Man's thought were extraordinarily developmental and all part of a 
very systematized critical plan. Hillis Miller supports a view of such 
de Manian master planning when he writes that "de Man is almost 
certain to have been there before we arrive and to have anticipated 
any 'deconstruction' of his own text we may perform" ( 168). Judging 
from this, there is no critical insight we can have about de Man's texts 
which he has not already seen and prepared us for. Consequently, no 
move in de Man is merely accidental or random; each critical point is 
strategically planned so that de Man's writings will carefully interlock 
and form a highly rigorous interpretive network of correspondences. 
Miller, Jacobs, and Bahti maintain this view as a means of paying 
homage to a great thinker. Yet, as the essays in Reading de Man 4




Reading reflect, the connections between de Man's sixties writings 
and, say, Allegories of Reading, may not be quite so rigorous as one 
might suppose. Gasche's essay on de Mani an "indifference" puts into 
question some of the critical organicism promoted by other con- 
tributors, since Gasche is wondering whether de Man's later work 
wasn't broaching the kind of non-referentiality which would have 
been totally alien to de Man's essays in Blindness and Insight. 
Derrida's piece, as well, destabilizes a genetic reading which would 
establish continuity between "The Rhetoric of Temporality" and de 
Man's later pieces. Derrida is suggesting that de Man's conception of 
the speech act suggests a radical break with the earlier discrimina- 
tions made between tropological devices like allegory, irony, and 
symbol. The "event," production, or invention of de Manian criticism 
is not reducible to the invention as device. That is, although de Man's 
pieces have a tendency to contrapuntally superimpose themselves on 
one another, they resist "invention" (as performance, device, but also 
in the musical sense). Lastly, Kevin Newmark's focus on the 
historical and the material makes one wonder whether de Man wasn't 
ironically breaking with "The Rhetoric of Temporality" by means of 
reinstating a certain naturalism. Exactly what the correspondences 
are between de Man's earlier and later collections still needs further 
clarification. In the individual essay reviews that follow we will notice 
the extent to which the evaluation of de Man's critical legacy is quite 
divided and unsettled. 
In "Lessons of Remembering and Forgetting," Timothy Bahti 
specifically focuses on "The Rhetoric of Temporality" in order to 
make the point that the essay ought to be understood in relationship to 
Martin Heidegger's thoughts on temporality, death, and forgetting. 
Bahti's understanding of time in Heidegger is quite restricted; the 
following gives us a good idea of how Bahti links Heidegger to de Man: 
The mutation (by de Man] of Heideggerian temporality as being- 
toward-death into a construal of understanding's temporality as 
understanding-toward-death does not yield the "horizon" of a 
horizon-of-expectations in the sense that such a spatialization of 
the image (in Wordsworth's Lucy poems] might render it 
knowable and therefore totalizable. . . . Rather, temporality 
takes the form of an anticipated horizon against which knowing is 
partial, and its `collection' is only the deferred recollection of 
what has actually been forgotten-death. According to this 5
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understanding, death is the condition for the meaningfulness of 
temporal understanding of literature and its truth. (246-7) 
Bahti's point is that in "The Rhetoric of Temporality" time is not 
manifested in a symbol but rather in allegory which defers a complete 
or totalized recovery of what has been forgotten, namely, death. 
Allegory refuses coincidence, identification, or reification: "Allegory 
at once reminds of what it is not-coincidence in time, with an 
origin-and remembers this only in order to forget it . .." (248). As 
such, allegory "institutes tin its relation to irony] a sheer series of 
recurrences that figures the forgetting or denial of these modes of 
knowledge [nostalgia, desire, etc] in their conversion into either a 
prefigured retrospective (allegorical) misunderstanding of irony or a 
projective (ironic) transcendental misunderstanding of allegory" 
(249). The notion of misunderstanding is quite crucial, because it 
suggests that forgetting involves error. That is, in the repetition of "a 
sheer series of recurrences" there is a "conversion" in which "forget- 
ting" is characterized by "misunderstanding." Bahti's interpretation, 
of course, is guided by a Derridean resistance to a rhetoric which 
privileges presence, and "The Rhetoric of Temporality" is analyzed 
in such a way that de Man appears as someone who was chiefly inter- 
ested in "an unfull present" and who, like Derrida, was a step ahead of 
Heidegger whose thinking was supposedly still caught in the grip of 
metaphysics. According to Bahti, neither presence (life) nor absence 
(death) can be constituted in a rhetoric of de Manian temporality, 
except as displaced-momentarily situated in a tropology of remem- 
bering and forgetting. 
Compared to what de Man actually writes in "The Rhetoric of 
Temporality," Bahti's reading is revisionary, since de Man's point 
about allegory and symbol was that they manifested different tropo- 
logical formations which were mimetically in conflict. The sentence 
by de Man which Bahti has in mind above reads as follows: "Whereas 
the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or identification, 
allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin, 
and, renouncing the nostalgia and the desire to coincide, it estab- 
lishes its language in the void of this temporal difference" (B! 207). 
Nothing is being said about remembrance, forgetting, or death. 
Rather, de Man is interested in how allegory "prevents the self from 
an illusory identification with the non-self" (BI 207). Notice that de 
Man's rhetoric hasn't even deconstructed the notion of the self. This is 6




underscored by his remark in the next sentence that "It is this painful 
knowledge [of the illusory identification I that we perceive at the 
moments when early romantic literature finds its true voice" (BI 207. 
Italics mine). Although the conceptual conditions are right for the 
kind of rhetorical deconstruction which Bahti identifies, "The 
Rhetoric of Temporality" does not really activate them in the way 
Bahti suggests. At best, de Man's essay counterpoints symbol, 
allegory, and irony in order to show that tropological formations are 
not entirely complementary and that when brought into relation or 
correspondence they harass our hermeneutical expectation that texts 
disclose themselves as unified, homogeneous systems. What de 
Man's essay demonstrates is that such a resistance to formalist con- 
sistency is historically determined by the erroneous way in which the 
romantics themselves understood the relation between symbol and 
allegory. To turn this into an implicit critique of Heidegger can always 
be done, of course, though it should be said that this is alien if not 
irrelevant to the aims of de Man's essay. The case for turning de Man 
into a philosopher who has successfully critiqued the shortcomings of 
Heidegger remains unconvincing. 
J. Hillis Miller's "'Reading' Part of a Paragraph" also bears 
closely on a reading of "The Rhetoric of Temporality," though Miller 
is mainly interested in considering one of these moments in Allegories 
of Reading where a critical condensation of thought takes place. 
Since it is the tutor text of Miller's piece, I quote in full. 
The paradigm for all texts consists of a figure (or a system of 
figures) and its deconstruction. But since this model cannot be 
closed off in a final reading, it engenders, in its turn, a supplemen- 
tary figural superposition which narrates the unreadability of the 
prior narration. As distinguished from primary deconstructive 
narratives centered on figures and ultimately always on 
metaphor, we can call such narratives to the second (or the third) 
degree allegories. Allegorical narratives tell the story of the 
failure to read whereas tropological narratives, such as the 
Second Discourse, tell the story of the failure to denominate. The 
difference is only a difference of degree and the allegory does not 
erase the figure. Allegories are always allegories of metaphor 
and, as such, they are always allegories of the impossibility of 
reading-a sentence in which the genitive 'of' has itself to be 
'read' as a metaphor. (Quoted in Miller, 156) 7
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According to Miller, de Man is insisting that we do not deconstruct 
texts, but that figurally texts deconstruct themselves because of the 
way in which-to take one example-metaphors are sedimented or 
superimposed on one another. We are considering something like a 
Freudian condensation in which disjunctions, contradictions, and 
outright incompatibilities bring "aberrancy into the open" (158). As 
de Man puts it, "A narrative endlessly tells the story of its own 
denominational aberration and it can only repeat this aberration on 
various levels of rhetorical complexity" (158). Miller points out that 
for de Man the text's auto-deconstruction generates auxiliary 
readings, each of which is aberrant. Miller's inference is that this auto- 
deconstruction can already be seen in essays like "The Rhetoric of 
Temporality" in so far as symbol, allegory, and irony tell the story of 
their own denominational aberrations which they are compelled to 
repeat. The way in which these tropological levels overlap would, for 
the later de Man, make up allegorical registers. Hence one could 
speak of second and third order narratives which "tell the story of the 
failure to read" (161), the failure to generate homogeneous meaning 
systems. The complexity of such contrapuntal superimpositions is 
well reflected in Miller's astute observation: 
The term 'degree' here is slightly odd, as is the addition in 
parentheses of 'or the third.' By 'or the third' I suppose de Man 
means that the deconstruction of the initially asserted figure or 
system of figures could already be thought of as a second narra- 
tive superimposed on the first, so that the allegory of the failure to 
read can be thought of as already a third narrative posited over 
the first two, while if the positing of the figure and its deconstruc- 
tion are thought of as a single story, then the allegory is only the 
second narrative. (161) 
But why does de Man use the word "allegory"? This is a ques- 
tion Miller wants to address, and not surprisingly it will lead him to 
reconsider "The Rhetoric of Temporality." Miller points out that 
for de Man allegory is always narrative and, as such, always 
temporalized. Allegories are in a sign-sign relation, Miller says, while 
symbols are in a sign-thing relation, and, as we noted above, allegory 
is characteristic of distance and difference, while symbols are charac- 
terized by nearness and identification. In bringing these positions in 
relation to the comments above from de Man's Allegories ofReading, 8




Miller notes that when an allegorical sign repeats an earlier sign, it 
also repeats "the error inscribed in that earlier sign, which was always 
a figure or system of figures and its deconstruction" (162). Here 
allegory is the carrier of the symbol, something already manifested in 
de Man's emblem of Eros and Psyche at the end of "The Rhetoric of 
Temporality." 
Most interesting is Miller's following remark in which he links 
the ending of "The Rhetoric of Temporality" to de Man's later under- 
standing of a text's inability to read itself: 
The error inscribed in the earlier sign is, however, repeated in the 
allegorical sign in a blind form, that is, in the form of an unrecog- 
nizable difference, or in the form of a difference that can be recog- 
nized only by those who have the key to the allegory. In that 
blindness, difference, and discrepancy between one part of the 
text and another, along the temporal and narrative line, lies the 
text's inability to read itself. (162-3) 
Miller points out that in "The Rhetoric of Temporality" de Man said 
the relation between an allegorical sign and its meaning was not 
"decreed by dogma." The relation is not determined by any inherent 
similarity between one sign and another, since "In allegory anything 
can stand for anything" (163). And this raises the point (also made by 
Gasche in his contribution to this volume) that de Man is concerned 
with the indifference of signification which, in Miller's context, allows 
for the reinscription and repetition of error in which "lies the text's 
inability to read itself" (163). Miller, then, suggests that error or 
blindness is a necessary consequence of 1) an allegorical temporality 
which is fated to suggest faulty (because indifferent) correspon- 
dences and of 2) symbolic constructions which literalize or naturalize 
aberrant connections. Allegory narrates the story of a text's inability 
to read itself, while symbols manifest the impossibility of correct 
denomination. As in "The Rhetoric of Temporality," allegory is per- 
formative, symbol constative. And again, as in "The Rhetoric of 
Temporality," reading is necessarily viewed as an open ended process 
in which no final determination of what a text means can be achieved, 
since meaning is constituted in registers of signification which are so 
closely aligned and subtly differentiated that meanings are held in a 
curious proximity which like Eros and Psyche touch only under the 
cover of blinding night. 9
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Miller's expert reading of de Man suggests that whereas "The 
Rhetoric of Temporality" considered the necessary relations of 
incompatible figural and narrative structures which writers and critics 
had naively dichotomized, Allegories of Reading took this approach 
further by demonstrating that in such necessary relations the text is 
destined to a transference of erroneous identifications and differentia- 
tions. Such transference, then, impedes the text from reading itself at 
levels of figuration and narration. The interpreter, therefore, must not 
be too optimistic about achieving an altogether satisfying reading, 
since textual reconstructions will point to figural and narrative rela- 
tionships which, strictly speaking, preclude textual readability. 
Although "The Rhetoric of Temporality" is itself not so explicitly 
pessimistic about how a text tells the story of its own unreadability, or 
about the question of error or aberrance, one can see from Miller's 
explanation how "The Rhetoric of Temporality" implicitly led de 
Man to his later positions. In the correspondence between symbol and 
allegory, for example, meanings are brought into erroneous conjunc- 
tions and a uniform reading or understanding of literature is 
obstructed. Far from reinforcing each other's meanings, the tropo- 
logical formations of the work conspire against synthesis. 
In "Allegories of Reading Paul de Man," Carol Jacobs takes up 
another approach to bringing the later and earlier de Man into rela- 
tion. Jacobs suggests that de Man intended Allegories of Reading to 
be superimposed on the structure of "The Rhetoric of Temporality" 
and that de Man's major oeuvre was written as a series of complex 
rhetorical reinscriptions that make up a kind of grand fugue. Jacobs' 
focus is de Man's own narrative style, and she begins her analysis by 
invoking what de Man had, in Allegories of Reading, once con- 
sidered to be characteristic of symbolicity: the continuity of de Man's 
own critical narrative as the "provisional syntheses that take place 
along the way" (105). Given that "The Rhetoric of Temporality" is a 
significant clue to de Man's narrative style, we should not be sur- 
prised that allegory is not far behind: "Side by side with these various 
modes of suggesting linear progress through time one finds, equally 
prevalent, a disconcerting insistence on the text as 'a series of repeti- 
tive reversals' I . . . I as a repetition of a pattern that ruptures dialec- 
tical progress" (106). But how can we account for the temporal con- 
tradictions between symbolicity and allegory in de Man's writings? 
Specifically, "how does time play its role in the performance of de 
Man's narrative" (106-7)? Jacobs argues, "time is that which marks 10




the realization of the impossibility of self-definition" (107). In other 
words, the rhetoric of temporality resists a linguistic essentialism and 
broaches possibilities of uninterpretability. This point is crucial to 
"The Rhetoric of Temporality" and in the context of Jacobs' essay 
suggests that the writings of de Man are all based on his temporal 
model. 
Such a reading( or more precisely, meta-reading) assumes that de 
Man's writings achieve an aesthetic or formal status akin to high art; 
hence, de Man's criticism is being read as if it had the status of litera- 
ture. This suggestion crops up in Jacobs' remark that in de Man's 
work "time is, coincidentally, an act of transgressive freedom, a rup- 
ture, that marks the impossibility of textual definition and self- 
definition. . . . It acts out, then, both the promise of progress and its 
failure, making promises it cannot fulfill in the present, making 
excuses rather than confessions for that which it might rather expose 
than hide, narrating endless fictions" (108). Is the temporality of de 
Man's criticism itself the narration of an endless fiction about the 
unreadability of literature? The suggestion is reinforced when Jacobs 
acknowledges that de Man's commentary on Rousseau "forms some- 
thing of a commentary on de Man's own style" (113), as if the dif- 
ference between criticism and literature were under erasure in de 
Man's work. 
Jacobs' essay is quite illuminating in its demonstration of the 
extent to which de Man's critical writings go out of their way to be self- 
reflexive. For example, she demonstrates that de Man's reading of 
Narcisse et Pygmalion, which occurs in Allegories of Reading, 
closely resembles the analysis of Stendhal in "The Rhetoric of 
Temporality," since in Allegories the privileged scene turns on an 
embrace strangely reminiscent of the Psyche and Eros myth. In 
Allegories, however, the embrace is cited in Rousseau. Once again, 
aporias of disjunction and conjunction come to the surface. So too do 
the rhetorical features of irony, allegory, and symbol (though Jacobs 
doesn't note them). Not surprisingly, this is followed by a commen- 
tary on "The Rhetoric of Temporality" in which we focus on de Man's 
construction and deconstruction of the historical schemes which 
legitimize his arguments. De Man's voice becomes so ironic, Jacobs 
says, that "it demonstrates the impossibility of being historical" 
(117). This means that the rhetorical self "rejects its own temporal 
movement of correcting error to produce (illusory) wisdom and recog- 
nizes it or rather performs it as a problem that exists within the 11
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rhetoric of temporality. In speaking of other critics and other theories 
of language, de Man necessarily spreads out along the axis of 
imaginary time what is, in fact, simultaneous within his text" (117). 
Jacobs call this the ironization of allegory, a term which comple- 
ments the allegorization of irony at the end of "The Rhetoric of 
Temporality." Literary history, Jacobs argues, is the temporality of a 
rhetoric that vertiginously vacillates between irony and allegory. 
Maybe she could have said that literary history is the symbol of this 
vacillation. "Irony and allegory endlessly replace one another: this 
trajectory can be read as a text engendering other, critical texts or as a 
text reading itself, as a gain in critical knowledge or as an irresolvable 
split and endless vacillation" (118). And time turns out to be an illu- 
sion created out of a "series of repetitive reversals" (118). This would 
be hardly a satisfactory conclusion for anyone acquainted with 
theories of temporality, for it rests on Jacobs' production of an 
ahistorical mise en abyme which has swallowed time up. Whereas de 
Man himself has been careful to counterpoint structures in ways that 
both encourage reflexive crossings as well as dampen assumed cor- 
respondences, Jacobs' analysis eventually collapses into a whirlpool 
of dizzying relationships which finally reduces temporality to mise en 
abyme or mere vacillation. 
Kevin Newmark, in "Paul de Man's History," considers the 
rhetoric of temporality more squarely in historical materialist terms: 
In the kind of move that has become habitual with de Man, 
historical terms, then, turn out not to be really historical after all, 
but rather are metaphors, and crude ones at that, for figural rela- 
tionships. But if historical terms refuse to tell us about history and 
end up being disguised as metaphors, then perhaps reading 
metaphors will turn out to be our only reliable means of learning 
something about history. (123) 
In considering how de Man reads the tropes of Baudelaire's 
"Correspondances," Newmark explores how metaphors and similes 
delimit moments of conjunction and disjunction. Newmark seizes on 
de Man's handling of the concept of figural transportation in 
Baudelaire and recalls that two distinct realms are being suggested, 
the aesthetic and the urban. "A reading that could disclose the urban 
subway system lurking beneath the lyrical transports of symbolist 
poetry would clearly be a first and important step in such a direction" 12




(127), that direction being the understanding of how literature and 
history interrelate. These two realms are brought into proximity 
through the surprise that a literalization of figure or of "transports" 
enables. What fascinates Newmark is how symbolic relations set up 
the possibility of a literalization or concretization in which the 
historical is situated more like an effect of signification rather than its 
cause: "History is a linguistic event, the arrangement of verbal 
buildings, a syntax of inscriptions that exists to be memorized and 
then read" (133). One senses, again, that we are perhaps not so far 
from the arguments of "The Rhetoric of Temporality." The figural or 
verbal interplay ("correspondance") in Baudelaire would cor- 
respond fairly well to allegory while the liberalization of the figure 
would relate to de Man's notion of the symbol which brings elements 
into a simultaneous and concrete relation. For Newmark, the way in 
which symbol and allegory are held in proximity by a trope which 
elicits both literal and figural readings delimits the coming to appear- 
ance of history in poetic language. Yet, "these figures are merely the 
incomplete narratives, or allegories, of a purely nonfigurative occur- 
rence that remains beyond them and their pseudomovement, and 
when they are read, such figures always and again tell the story of their 
impossibility to occur historically" (134). In spite of this Newmark is 
willing to talk about actual history: the repeated manifestation of 
linguistic aporias. Newmark is not so far from recognizing that at best 
one can bring signifying relations into correspondence which, as in 
"The Rhetoric of Temporality," outline the trajectory of concrete 
historical moments while, at the same time, demonstrating why 
history is mimetically inaccessible. Because Newmark is pushing de 
Man's tutor text, "Anthropomorphism and Trope in Lyric," further 
than it actually wants to go, he ends up making the dubious claim that 
terms like history, economics, and ideology are being rehabilitated by 
de Man. Newmark's conclusion suggests that such notions are always 
already under erasure and that they become significant only in rela- 
tion to "incomplete narratives," "allegories," or a "nonfigurative 
occurrence." Exactly what that means is not made clear, though 
Newmark's footnotes suggest that we may find clues in the writings of 
Walter Benjamin. That Newmark has not provided a detailed account 
of how de Man read Benjamin and how that reading affects de Man's 
understanding of history is disappointing. Certainly, Newmark's 
piece touches on a very suggestive conjunction with Benjamin which 
most commentators on de Man often miss. 13
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Rodolphe Gasche's "In-Difference to Philosophy" once more 
draws on the "symbol" / "allegory" distinction from "The Rhetoric 
of Temporality" by counterpointing "rhetoric" to "philosophy." 
Philosophy is the "discourse of difference" and rhetoric is the dis- 
course of "self-affirmation." But just as philosophy reaches the 
pinnacle of a discourse of difference in the work of Hegel, one finds a 
"retrogression toward rhetoric" in figures like Friedrich Schlegel. De 
Man is to some extent participating in this romantic retrogression: 
Despite some major differences to be emphasized hereafter, Paul 
de Man's linguistic or rhetorical reading of literature and 
philosophy continues, in a certain manner, that romantic project 
of dissolving the difference constitutive of both philosophy and 
literature, philosophy and rhetoric. In the following analysis 
devoted to de Man's reading of the philosophical texts of 
Nietzsche, Kant, and Hegel, we will attempt to make this point. 
(262) 
More specifically, Gasche's insight will be that, 
"A rhetorical reading, for de Man, is, indeed, a reading that seeks 
the transgression of philosophical difference in an indifference 
that is so radical as to become entirely indifferent-devoid of all 
relation-to the philosophical." (262) 
Although Gasche's intriguing essay is far too complex to summarize, 
the following sentences from the close of his piece will give the reader 
a good idea of how Gasche situates his thesis: 
In short, the literary and the philosophical discourse are, for de 
Man, meaningful enterprises involved in forgetting or recuperat- 
ing the nonphenomenal properties of the material and formal act 
of figuration, properties that come into view, as he insists, 
through figuration itself, precisely to the extent in which figura- 
tion is itself a repetition of the originary violence of positing. All 
there can be, consequently, is an endless series of acts of imposi- 
tion that, because they lack all continuity with what precedes 
them, repeat, without ever lending themselves to any real 
discrimination, the 'original' arbitrary act of linguistic positing. 
Ultimately, there is no difference between that act and the 
authority of meaning. (289) 14




Gasche is developing a point which has also been brought up in Hillis 
Miller's essay, namely, that in de Man no ground supports the rela- 
tion of one sign to another. For de Man linguistic relationships "just 
happen," Miller says (163). Gasche discusses this, of course, in terms 
of an indifference, of acts of linguistic imposition that lack any 
inherent continuity. According to Gasche, de Man's project was never 
to write on philosophy but to write in a way that was indifferent to it, 
that refused to engage philosophy as a discourse of difference and in 
so doing dismantled its fondest assumptions. That de Man's critical 
writings did not occur in relation to philosophy is justified by his state- 
ment that "nothing . . . ever happens in relation, positive or negative, 
to anything that precedes, follows, or exists elsewhere, but only as a 
random event . ." (293). 
In its baldest sense such quotations give credence to those who 
have dismissed deconstruction as a relativistic and ad hoc critical 
approach. Moreover, one wonders why, if theory is reducible to some 
kind of random event, de Man placed so much emphasis on critical 
rigor. Indeed, one must wonder whether de Man fell into some kind of 
very naive position or whether Gasche's decontextualization of de 
Man's remarks is misleading. It ought to be noted, of course, that in 
"The Rhetoric of Temporality" de Man did not champion a radical 
view of the non-relationality of one sign to another; only much later do 
we hear that "nothing . . . ever happens in relation . . . to anything." 
But why and how did de Man arrive at such a position? If one bothers 
to read de Man's "Shelley Disfigured"-it is quoted by Gasche at the 
end of his piece-, one will notice that it is in relation to Shelley's The 
Thumph of Life that de Man sights an aporia between the performa- 
tive and the constative which comes to appearance as an iteration of 
something that has no connection to what comes either before or after. 
In Shelley, "the sun does not appear in conjunction with or in reaction 
to the night and the stars, but of its own unrelated power" (The 
Rhetoric of Romanticism, 116). How does Shelley simply posit the 
sun? By what act of speech does the sun enter into the poem? "It can 
only be because we impose, in our turn, on the senseless power of 
positional language the authority of sense and of meaning" (RR, 117). 
However, de Man says this is inconsistent, because if language can 
posit (performatively) and mean (constatively), it "cannot posit 
meaning" (RR, 117). The act of positing the sun and the act of 
making it mean something belong to two different orders of expres- 
sion which are not inherently bound. It is here that the arbitrary 15
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positing of the sun takes place even as the authority of sense and 
meaning bears it away. But in this case, the arbitrary never serves as 
ground; it is not privileged. Gasche seems to think otherwise: "His lde 
Man's] radical empiricism-his stress on the arbitrariness, extreme 
singularity, and impenetrable materiality of the linguistic acts and 
signifier-appears to have gained such momentum here that its own 
generality and universality turn into a radical challenge to the 
generality of philosophical difference" (292). It would seem much 
more appropriate to say that for de Man theory established and broke 
correspondences in ways that disarticulate the limits of difference and 
identity and that the logic of such a disarticulation is, far from abso- 
lutely random, brought into a necessary relational proximity with 
texts in which the very notion of relationality is itself put into question 
though not utterly annihilated. 
Lastly, we should take into consideration Jacques Derrida's 
"Psyche: Inventions of the Other," an essay which implicitly asks to 
be allegorically superimposed on previous works by Derrida-for 
example, "The Double Session," "Signeponge," "Limited Inc 
abc . . . ," "Of An Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in 
major importance 
to Derrida's essay is a reconsideration of the performative/consta- 
tive distinction which de Man invoked in Allegories ofReading. In the 
chapter, "Rhetoric of Persuasion (Nietzsche)," de Man focused on 
language as an event or speech act and demonstrates how the consta- 
tive and the performative are brought into a chiastic relation which 
breaks with the principle of contradiction: "The first passage 1 in 
Nietzsche] on identity showed that constative language is in fact per- 
formative, but the second passage tin Nietzsche] asserts that the pos- 
sibility for language to perform is just as fictional as the possibility for 
language to assert" (Allegories of Reading, p. 129). De Man 
concludes, "the differentiation between performative and constative 
language (which Nietzsche anticipates) is undecidable; the decon- 
struction leading from the one model to the other is irreversible but it 
always remains suspended, regardless of how often it is repeated" 
(A R,p. 130). One of de Man's final points, then, is that "Rhetoric is a 
text in that it allows for two incompatible, mutually self-destructive 
points of view, and therefore puts an insurmountable obstacle in the 
way of any reading or understanding" (AR, p. 131). 
It is noteworthy that in "Psyche: Inventions of the Other" 
Derrida does not subscribe to the idea that deconstruction delimits the 16




unreadability of a literary text. Rather for Derrida deconstruction 
facilitates readability, a point he makes quite prominently at the end of 
a section on Francis Ponge's "Fable": 
Deconstruction is inventive or it is nothing at all; it does not settle 
for methodical procedures, it opens up a passageway, it marches 
ahead and marks a trail; its writing is not only performative, it 
produces rules-other conventions-for new performativities 
and never installs itself in the theoretical assurance of a simple 
opposition between performative and constative. Its process 
involves an affirmation, this latter being linked to the coming- 
the venire-in event, advent, invention. But it can only make it by 
deconstructing a conceptual and institutional structure of inven- 
tion that would neutralize by putting the stamp of reason on some 
aspect of invention, of inventive power as if it were necessary, 
over and beyond a certain traditional status of invention, to 
reinvent the future. (42) 
Here one can see the extent to which Derrida strongly breaks with 
Paul de Man in Allegories of Reading. In place of a characterization 
of deconstruction that stresses impasse, fatality, aporia, grid-lock, 
impossibility, obstruction, aberrance, and uninterpretability, Derrida 
views deconstruction as an act of invention, precipitation, broaching, 
and unblocking. For Derrida deconstruction does not stall in the 
double binds of the performative and the constative, but "involves an 
affirmation," invokes a "coming," an "event," or "advent" that is 
only neutralized by "the stamp of reason." Derrida's notion of inven- 
tion is not that of de Man's mutually self-destructive points of view 
which are allegorically fated to achieve a certain grid-lock or the 
freezing up of the textual machinery; rather, Derrida wants to pursue 
invention as a founding event or beginning which is always already 
differed or deferred from what we might call the origin. Invention, for 
Derrida, is a structure of conceptual relationships which have been 
traditionally overstabilized by privileging the notion of device (inven- 
tion as machine or method) and the priority of agency (the inventor). 
The term "invention" binds a "technical order" to "metaphysical 
humanism" (44). Inventions require patents, Derrida recalls, and for 
an invention to be legitimized it must be stabilized or defined within a 
certain institutional standing. 
Although Derrida does not explicitly say so, the invention under 17
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discussion throughout this essay is "deconstruction" and Derrida is 
implicitly interrogating how "deconstruction" can come to appear- 
ance as an institutionalized invention, method, or device or how he 
himself can come to appearance as its inventor if the founding event 
that is deconstruction radically breaks with institutionalized concepts 
or statutes without which an invention cannot be recognized. How is 
the performance of deconstruction as invention to be squared with its 
institutionalized constative description as method or device? 
In addition, there is another and more sensitive issue. Who has 
invented deconstruction? Derrida or de Man? Or, is deconstruction 
not an invention which can be set up in such an anthropomorphic 
way? Is it not rather, like a musical invention, something which is con- 
stituted in the interweaving of various intellectual lines of thought? 
When Derrida speaks of signatures and countersignatures and of 
fathers and sons, he is, in fact, pointing out that inventions are always 
signed for or appropriated by others. That is, deconstruction as a 
linguistic event cannot be anything else but an "invention of the 
other," of something countersigned by someone else. De Man has 
appropriated Derrida, just as Derrida is now appropriating de Man. 
And in this appropriative performance something gets invented, 
something comes about, an event happens. This event, however, is 
always already allegorical in that it is always in relation to an "other" 
that an "invention" (in the sense of device, musical structure, found- 
ing event) is made, institutionalized, passed on, used, etc. In its 
metaphysical sense, Psyche would stand for the mentality of this 
invention, something akin to what one corporation calls "the mind of 
Minolta," though for Derrida, of course, the notion of such a "mind" 
is what is being critiqued. 
Psyche, however, also refers us to the Eros and Psyche story 
which de Man cites in "The Rhetoric of Temporality" and Derrida 
complements that citation with a reading of "Fable" by Francis 
Ponge in which the figure of Psyche is allegorically suggested as con- 
templating herself in a double sided mirror or "psyche." "But in 
French a psyche, a homonym and common noun, is also a large 
double mirror installed on a rotating stand. The woman, let us say 
Psyche, her beauty or her truth, can be reflected there, can admire or 
adorn herself from head to foot" (38-39). Derrida maintains that 
"Fable" "puts into action the question of reference, of the specu- 
larity of language or of literature, and of the possibility of stating the 
other or speaking to the other" (31). "Fable" takes place as an event 18




which conflates both the performative (the productive, the trans- 
formative) and the constative ( the saying what is. the unveiling) and as 
such bears on an "invention"-the double mirror, the allegory of 
Psyche, the event that is the poem-which is radically unstable: "An 
infinitely rapid circulation-such are the irony and the temporality of 
this text-all at once shunts the performative into the constative, and 
vice versa" (34). Noting the constative and performative valences of 
the opening line to "Fable"-"Par le mot par commence donc ce 
texte"-, Derrida concludes that 
The infinitely rapid oscillation between the performative 
and the constative, between language and metalanguage, fiction 
and nonfiction, autoreference and heteroreference, etc.. does not 
just produce an essential instability. This instability constitutes 
that very event-let us say, the work-whose invention disturbs 
normally, as it were, the norms, the statutes, and the rules. . . . 
The fabulatory economy of a very simple little sentence, 
perfectly normal in its grammar, spontaneously deconstructs the 
oppositional logic that relies on an untouchable distinction 
between the performative and the constative and so many other 
related distinctions; it deconstructs that logic without disabling it 
totally, to be sure, since it also needs it in order to detonate the 
speech event. (34-35) 
We recall that in "The Rhetoric of Temporality" allegory is performa- 
tive, differentiating, and diachronic, while the symbol was consta- 
tive, identifying, and synchronic. "Fable" could be said to make these 
tropological conditions of language bear on the "invention" of lan- 
guage as an event that does not impede reading or obstruct interpreta- 
tion, but that deconstructs without disabling, that deconstructs in 
order to detonate the speech event. The mirror and the woman are but 
the tropological effects of such a detonation though, at the same time, 
they are the "double seance" which serves as the triggering 
mechanism of "Fable." as the invention of the poem. Whereas in de 
Man temporality manifests itself in the repetition and aberrance of dif- 
ference, in Derrida's account temporality is situated in terms of that 
which is coming, of the "event" which is being triggered in the re- 
doubling of the psyche. Hence, just as the symbol is fractured or 
broken-"Fable" itself refers to the shattering of the mirror-the 
temporality of allegory is similarly wiped out by an anticipatory or 19
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apocalyptic moment of speech as event. Initiating, rupturing, 
triggering, breaking open, the invention of a "Fable" broaches a 
dissemination or efflorescence which can no longer be identified with 
the impotent reading theory championed by de Man. In this division 
the psyche of deconstruction is itself ruptured or fissured, its double 
mirror triggering the device of a theory which cannot be reduced to a 
patent, trademark, or corporate body. This, then, would be the "mind 
of deconstruction." 
Reading de Man Reading is certainly a very important collec- 
tion of articles on the work of de Man, and it is unfortunate that space 
does not permit commentary on the other very interesting essays. 
Although not user friendly, the book will be very important for spe- 
cialists in contemporary theory with an interest in de Man. Most inter- 
esting to me are the ways in which each writer countersigns for de 
Man's theories and, in particular, the extent to which there is a wider 
range of evaluations and interpretations than I would have otherwise 
assumed. Indeed, the collection implicitly demonstrates that even 
expert readers, all of them very sympathetic or at least receptive to de 
Man, are still at an exploratory stage of interpretation; no rigid "party 
line" has been established within this "school." Certainly, the wide 
discrepancy between Hillis Miller's excellent close reading of de Man 
and Derrida's powerful and multi-faceted meditation on "invention" 
strikes me as symptomatic of the wide latitude of possibilities for 
interpreting de Man's later work. In addition, the entire volume 
reminds us that de Man's contributions to language and literary study 
have been of such a high order of critical reflection that, in fact, the 
recent revelations about de Man's wartime writings seem, for the 
moment, quite overshadowed. At times one may even be seduced into 
agreeing with Geoffrey Hartman that "de Man's critique of every 
tendency to totalize literature or language, to see unity where there is 
no unity, could be a belated, but still powerful, act of conscience" 
(23). 20
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